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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DUSTIN MARSHALL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 20030868-CA 
ARGUMENT 
I. REVERSAL OF THE EQUITY SKIMMING CONVICTION IS REQUIRED 
BECAUSE THE VERDICT WAS PREMISED ON A TRANSACTION 
SPECIFICALLY ABANDONED BY THE PROSECUTOR AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING AND THAT WAS NOT BOUND OVER AFTER 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
Marshall contends he was tried and convicted of equity skimming arising 
out of a criminal episode for which he was not bound over by the magistrate. As 
a result, Marshall was denied the protections of a preliminary hearing on the 
transaction involving the sale of the Chevy S-10 pick-up on July 19, 2002, the 
only transaction for which he was convicted. The variance between the evidence 
and arguments of the State at the preliminary hearing and the evidence and 
arguments of the State at the trial is not insignificant. See generally, Opening 
Brief of Appellant, Point I. State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985); and State v. Jensen, 136 P.2d 949, 951-52 
1 
(1943) ("defendant cannot be convicted of a crime for which he was not given or 
for which he did not waive a preliminary hearing.") 
The State concedes that jurisdictional errors may be raised at any time. 
State's Brief at 9. However, the State asserts the variance in proof is cured 
because the Information alleged a range of dates from "on or between July 19 to 
October, 2002;" and therefore, the Defendant received a preliminary hearing for 
the July 19th transaction. State's brief at 11-12. This argument must fail since it 
flatly ignores that the prosecutor abandoned the July 19th transaction before the 
magistrate bound over the Defendant to the District Court. The continuous 
conduct argument advanced on appeal, if accepted by this Court, would allow the 
State to put the Defendant and magistrate on notice of a particular transaction 
(the sale of the Monte Carlo to the Fausetts) to obtain a bind over at the 
preliminary hearing, but then switch and revive the abandoned transaction (the 
contract for the sale of the Chevy S-10 pick-up) at trial. The Defendant will be 
denied due process if the State is permitted to substitute transactions to sustain a 
conviction over which there was no bind over. See e.g. Ortega, infra. 
At the close of the evidence at the preliminary hearing, the magistrate 
asked the prosecutor to clarify which transaction - the July 19th transaction with 
Abplanalp or the July 30th transaction with the Fausetts - constituted the crime of 
equity skimming: 
THE COURT: This is an unusual statute, one we don't deal wi th. . . 
I guess there's two ways that I could look at this. I 
2 
could look at the transaction - two transactions that 
have been spoken of. One is the initial transaction 
and the other one is the transaction that's been 
spoken of, where there was an agreement to sell on 
a car lot. Are you relying upon one to the exclusion 
of the other or both of those? 
MR. THOMAS: Well, I think the focus is that transfer of the Monte 
Carlo's ownership to someone else while there was 
an existing lien is where our -
THE COURT: That's your focus? 
MR. THOMAS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that's where we were. 
Okay, you may address the issues. 
(R. 132 at 43-44.) 
Based on the prosecutor's clarification, the magistrate remarked, "I'm glad for the 
explanation. You're focusing on the sale of the Monte Carlo." R. 132 at 45, and 
then bound over only the July 30th transaction. 
The State's argument on appeal that the bind over included the July 19th 
transaction because the information included the range of dates would allow the 
State to actively mislead the Defendant and the Court and thereby render the 
protection of a preliminary hearing meaningless. In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 
3 
778 (Utah 1980), the Court noted that one of the important purposes of a 
preliminary hearing is providing the accused with the particulars of the nature of 
the State's case. Indeed as early as 1908, the Supreme Court explained why the 
preliminary hearing has become part of the fabric of criminal procedure in this 
State: 
To secure to the accused, before he is brought to the trial 
under information, the right to be advised of the nature of 
accusation against him . . . He is thus enabled, if he so 
desires, to fully inform himself of the facts upon which the 
State relies to sustain the charge made against him, and be 
prepared to meet them at the trial. 
State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085, 1086 (1908). 
The State committed to the July 30th transaction at the preliminary hearing. 
The State cannot now be heard to revive the abandoned July 19th transaction. 
When a crime is charged by information, the pleader "must have in mind a 
particular transaction having the elements of time, place, and circumstance, 
which transaction in his judgment is unlawful.. .." State v. Nelson, 176 P.860, 
861 (Utah 1918). Also, see State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138,1139 (Utah 1988) 
(variance between charge bound over and charge proven at trial necessitated 
new trial because defendant deprived of preliminary hearing). 
The State also claims that Marshall is assuming without basis that the 
jurors convicted him for the July 19th transaction, and contends that the elements 
4 
instruction focusing the jurors on the equity skimming which allegedly occurred 
"on or about July 19" was broad enough to include the July 30th transaction with 
the Fausetts. State's brief at 16-18. This argument ignores that the only date 
mentioned in the elements instruction was July 19, the transaction date with 
Abplanalp, and not July 30th, the transaction date with the Fausetts. Moreover, 
the court's final instruction to the jury which informed them of the possible 
verdicts on the equity skimming count, gave the jurors the option of convicting or 
acquitting Marshall for the "incident date July 19, 2002." (R. 151). The final 
verdict likewise identified the date for the Equity Skimming charge as July 19, 
2002 (R. 140)."1 The Court, through its instructions, directed the jury to consider 
whether equity skimming occurred on July 19th, not July 30th and not the range of 
dates contained in the information (July 19 to October 2002). This constellation 
of instructions impels one to the ineluctable conclusion that the jury only 
considered and convicted Mr. Marshall of equity skimming for the July 19th 
transaction and not for the July 30th transaction. 
This was clear to the trial court. In considering but ultimately denying the 
Motion for a New Trial, Judge Payne noted: 
"But I think it's clear to me that the evidence was presented 
and the argument was made with respect to the violation of 
iThe two relevant jury instructions and the final verdict are copied in the 
addendum to this brief as A and B respectively. 
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the law occurring on the transfer on July 30th to Mr. and Mrs. 
Fausett." 
(R. 274 at 15.) 
And later: 
"It's interesting that, with respect to that in her argument, Ms. 
Barton Coombs argument, she says that, There was no way 
that the jury could have found him guilty of the offense as 
occurring on July 19th.' And I believe that's correct. Now, I 
don't think that anybody ever alleged that the transaction on 
July 19th, which was actually a transaction that was 
completed, I think on the 23rd of July, that there was never any 
allegation that the law was violated at that time, and yet as I 
keep coming back we have jury instructions which refer to that 
date." (Emphasis added). 
(R. 274 at 16-17.) 
The State implicitly contends that because trial counsel assented to the 
instructions which were given and did not object, the error was invited, and 
should not be addressed on appeal. State's brief at 12-14. Just as parties may 
not create jurisdiction by stipulation, they may not do so by incompetence. See, 
e.g., Phoenix Indemnity Insurance Company v. Smith, 2002 UT 49, U 5,48 P.3d 
976 (parties may not confer jurisdiction by agreement). Assuming arguendo that 
trial counsel did invite the error, this decision is still subject to review for objective 
6 
unreasonableness under the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine. 
See, e.g., State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,158-59 (Utah 1989) (consciously 
chosen trial strategies are still reviewed for ineffective assistance). 
The State does not address or refute Marshall's contention that trial 
counsel's failure to object to his being tried and convicted for an offense in the 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction, see Opening Brief of Appellant at 31-32, 
and Marshall stands by that argument. 
Because the jury instructions and verdict demonstrate that Marshall was 
convicted for the July 19th transaction, which the State abandoned at preliminary 
hearing , and for which he was not bound over, and for which there was no 
jurisdiction, a new trial is required. See, Nelson, Ortega, supra. 
II. REVERSAL IS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL 
The State appears to believe that defeating an ineffective assistance claim 
is limited only by the State's ability to characterize a defect as legitimate trial 
strategy unfettered and unimpeded by resort to the record . Mr. Marshall submits 
that the record evidence demonstrates unambiguously that there was no 
reasonable consciously chosen strategy guiding trial counsel's deficiencies. 
A. Joinder of Cases 
1. Not a Conscious Strategy 
The State contends that trial counsel properly moved to join the 
misdemeanor counts of selling cars without a license with the felony equity 
7 
skimming count, as part of a reasonable strategy of showing the jurors that the 
defense would own up to Marshall's true violations of the law, and thereby lend 
credence to his defense to the felony charge of equity skimming. State's brief at 
29-31. This is a fiction. Defense counsel had absolutely no strategy in mind. 
How else does one make any sense of trial counsel's pointless objections (R. 
267 at 15-17, 20-27, 29-31, 33-35, 36-39, 41, 43-50, 52-55) and multiple futile 
questions trying to refute the fact that Marshall was a salesperson who should 
have been licensed (R. 267 at 18-19, 21-22, 27-28, 32-33, 35, 39-41, 50-52). 
Defense counsel's examination of the Defendant which revealed beyond all 
doubt that he was guilty of being an unlicensed salesman proves the point that 
there was no strategy guiding the defense. This was a rudderless ship. If it was 
part of a strategy to convict on the lesser charges but acquit on the felony, it 
would have at least been mentioned for an ephemeral moment to focus the jury's 
attention on the Defendant's honest admission of his wrongdoing. Instead, the 
four counts of unlicensed selling were never mentioned in either opening or 
closing statements. Defense counsel did not concede Marshall's guilt of the 
misdemeanor licensing violation (R. 267 at 8-10, R. 268 at 277-284) and it is 
pure fiction to claim that joinder was a reasonable trial strategy. 
2. Objectively Unreasonable Assistance 
Joinder of charges is governed by Rule 9.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and U.C.A. § 77-8a-1. Rule 9.5 permits joinder when multiple 
offenses arise from a single criminal episode. A single criminal episode is 
8 
defined in U.C.A. § 76-1-401 as "all conduct which is closely related in time and 
is incident to an attempt to an accomplishment of a single criminal objective." 
The four different counts of Selling Without a License were not incident to an 
attempt to accomplishment of a single criminal objective. 
The same criminal episode statue specifically incorporates § 77-8a-1 in the 
consideration of when offenses should be joined. The joinder statue only permits 
the joinder of separate offenses in an information if the offenses are: 
(a) Based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission; of 
(b) Alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
The selling of cars without a license was not part of the same scheme or 
plan as the Equity Skimming arising from Mountain States Motors taking in Mr. 
Abplanalp's 1996 Monte Carlo in trade for the sale of a 1999 Chevrolet S-10 
pickup truck. 
3. Prejudice 
In the instant matter, the prejudice to the Defendant cannot be 
underestimated. Ms. Barton-Coombs made the affirmative motion to join the 
Equity Skimming charge with four counts of Acting in Capacity Without a License 
When Required charges. The introduction of the evidence relating to selling cars 
without a license added to the impression the Defendant was unscrupulous and 
not worthy of belief. The State would not have been permitted to introduce 
evidence of the Defendant's commission of these offenses in the Equity 
9 
Skimming trial had the matters remain severed. The motion to join these 
charges was a disastrous move by defense counsel and constituted deficient 
representation. The prejudicial and inflammatory effect of the evidence 
pertaining to the four Acting Without a License charges outweighed any probative 
value it might have in relation to the Equity Skimming charge and defense 
counsel should not have joined the four charges for which there was no defense 
with the Equity Skimming charge. 
B. Failing to Cross-Examine Abplanalp on Prior Inconsistent 
Statements. 
The State contends that this Court should strike the footnotes in this 
argument from Marshall's opening brief, and then abstain from reaching the 
merits of the issue for inadequate briefing. The State suggests that counsel for 
Marshall jammed the necessary facts into the footnotes to evade the page 
limitations of rule 24. State's brief at 34-35. 
Review of Marshall's opening brief confirms that the substance of the 
contents of each of the footnotes in question first appears in the double-spaced 
text of the statement of facts.2 In repeating the facts in the footnotes, counsel for 
Marshall was not trying to evade the page limitations of rule 24, but was 
complying with the obligation of citing to the record, and reminding the Court of 
2The substance of footnote 16 first appears in the second full paragraph of page 
8. The substance of footnote 17 first appears in the second full paragraph on 
page 20. The substance of footnote 18 first appears in the second full paragraph 
of page 19. 
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the pertinent facts from the statement of facts. The State's objection should be 
eschewed. 
The evidence presented a credibility contest between Mr. Abplanalp, a 19-
year-old teenager at the time of the transaction, and the Defendant, a used car 
salesman. Precisely what Mr. Marshall said to Mr. Abplanalp at the time that the 
contract for the purchase of the Chevy S-10 pick-up was signed by Abplanalp 
was pivotal to the jury's determination. Convincing the jury that Mr. Abplanalp 
had assumed something different from what the documents actually said and 
what Mr. Marshall said to Mr. Abplanalp during the transaction, were necessary 
and essential strategy to an acquittal. 
The State argued in closing argument that Mr. Marshall made material 
misrepresentations to Mr. Abplanalp about who would pay off the lien on the 
Monte Carlo being traded to the car dealership. (R. 268 at 289). The buyer 
changed his story and key details pertaining to the alleged misrepresentations 
made by Mr. Marshall. These inconsistencies went unchallenged by defense 
counsel. The failure to demonstrate for the jury Mr. Abplanalp's inconsistent 
testimony on these key points is inexcusable and cannot be condoned with the 
State's label of reasonable trial strategy. 
The State takes the position that Abplanalp's preliminary hearing and trial 
testimony were consistent in reflecting Abplanalp's contention that Marshall told 
him that the zero on the payoff line on the S-10 sales contract meant that the 
dealership would pay off the balance on the Monte Carlo. State's brief at 36, 
11 
citing R. 132 at 9-12; R. 267 at 60, 63-64, 67, R. 268 at 258, 262. The State is 
again wrong. 
By reviewing the pages of the preliminary hearing transcript cited by the 
State plus three more, this Court will confirm that at the preliminary hearing, 
Abplanalp testified that Marshall did not say who would pay off the lien or discuss 
the zero on the payoff line in the sales contract at the time of the sale, but did tell 
Abplanalp sometime later when Abplanalp realized that the Monte Carlo had not 
been paid off that "had he put a different number, then he would have been 
responsible - or I would have been responsible." (R. 132 at 9-14,19). He 
maintained that his expectation that the dealership would pay off the Monte Carlo 
was premised on his "common sense" assumption and on Abplanalp's inability to 
pay for both the car and the truck (R. 132 at 9-14,19); but not on any 
misrepresentation of Mr. Marshall. 
When Abplanalp answered defense counsel's questions at trial that 
Marshall told him the dealership would pay off the Monte Carlo and had him fill 
out an authorization for payoff form to facilitate doing so (R. 268 at 258-262), trial 
counsel should have immediately impeached the witness with his prior sworn 
testimony at the preliminary hearing that he and Marshall did not discuss who 
would pay off the loan, that Abplanalp did not sign any papers with regard to that 
issue, and that Abplanalp only assumed that Mountain States would pay off the 
Monte Carlo (R. 132 at 9-120,12-14, 19). This was a key opportunity to destroy 
12 
Abplanalp's credibility missed by defense counsel. Rather than torn asunder, the 
witness escaped unscathed, unruffled, and with his credibility fully in tact. 
Al II ii1 | in'In i in MI v In MI ii n | mi M.n i 11 ,'»i, ','()()'•$, tin1 prnst-'Tiitoi ,iskeil Mr. 
Abplanalp a series of leading questions about who Mr. Marshall said would pay 
the outstanding lien on the Monte Carlo. Mr. Abplanalp did not follow the 
p r o -
Mountain States would pay off the Monte Carlo. The following dialogue occurred 
during the prosecutor's direct examination of the witness: 
C.i Ml i, iinl i HI h II iinl iHI "^ i n innIt i MIIII impressio 
somebody else was going to pay that off [$3,500 lien]. 
A: I was. 
C 
A: That's just what I expect the dealer to do when I trade a 
vehicle in, is to actually take care of the lien at the bank. 
(Emphasis added.) 
v ^ . i < ' I 
Q. Ukiy, ami why did you expect the dealer to take care of the lien? 
Was that part of your negotiated agreement with Mr. Marshall? 
A: Any other vehicle I've looked at, that's part of the negotiations. 
Q: Okay, and in this particular case is it fair to say that because you 
had told him there was a lien i " " • i 
13 
would expect that Mountain States would in fact take care of that 
lien? 
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Objection, your Honor. Leading. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q: Is there - can you explain to the Court in your own words why it 
was that you felt like Mountain States would take care of that lien. 
A: Because I had traded the vehicle into their possession and the 
whole point of trading the vehicle in is to get the one you've paid 
off, so that you can take care of the other payment. 
(R. 132 at 14.) 
Mr. Abplanalp also made it perfectly clear in his preliminary hearing 
testimony that he had not paid any attention to or bothered to read the sales 
contract which contained a zero balance on line 11 corresponding to the existing 
lien. (Plaintiffs Ex. 3). 
Q. Had you looked at that before? 
A. I had not. 
(R. 132 at 15.) 
Also at the preliminary hearing defense counsel asked Mr. Abplanalp 
about his understanding of who would pay the lien to Mountain America Credit 
Union at the time the contract formation with the sale of the S-10 pick-up. 
According to Mr. Abplanalp, there was no conversation about who would pay the 
outstanding lien: 
14 
Q: And at that time did you discuss specifically who was going to 
pay 
A. We did not. 
This preliminary hearing testimony was decidedly different from Mr. 
Abplanalp's testimony at trial where he testified unequivocally that Mr. Marshall 
told him that Mountain States Motors would pay off the outstanding lien on the 
Monte Carlo. R. 268 at 258, 261, 266, 267. This misrepresentation was central 
to the State's closing argument that Mr. Marshall was guilty of Equity Skimming. 
("Mr. Marshall represented to Mr. Abplanalp that he \ * ^ 
Mountain America." R. 268 at 289.) 
The State also claims that there was no inconsistency by Abplanalp 
regarding the-' rum M ml lie hdh'veil he IUHMIPM In | ' Slate's In id , il 
39. This is not true. By reviewing page 267 of his testimony, and page 109 of 
Shelly Sorenson's testimony, the Court can confirm that Abplanalp did apply for a 
loan in the amount of $10, 918.35 
268 at 267, R. 267 at 109). In contrast, the Court can see that on page 265 of 
his testimony, he claimed that he did not know he needed some $900 more than 
$10 
the check (R. 268 at 265). 
The State is correct that there was no inconsistency in Abplanalp's 
tostinn my II (| inlnni In i in in, pliinic i ill In in nli i i mil d lm I' I n lull 
apologizes for misreading the record. 
Impeaching Abplanalp's credibility was key to an acquittal. His testimony 
changed from assuming the dealership would pay off the credit union lien at the 
preliminary hearing to an unequivocal accusation that Mr. Marshall represented 
that Mountain States would pay it at trial. Failure to impeach the witness with his 
prior inconsistent testimony fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome 
had trial counsel done so. 
C. Odometer Fraud. 
With regard to the odometer fraud evidence, the State again complains 
that counsel for Marshall put the facts in the footnotes to evade the Court's page 
limitation. State's brief at 39-40. 
As was true of the other footnotes the State seeks to strike, the footnotes 
pertaining to the odometer fraud argument merely repeat the facts which appear 
double spaced earlier in the brief.3 In repeating the facts in the footnotes, 
counsel complies with the requirement of citing to the record and reminds the 
Court of previously stated facts which are pertinent to the specific argument. 
The State claims that trial counsel was acting on valid trial strategy in 
proving that odometer fraud was normal at the dealership where Marshall 
worked, in order to insulate Marshall from the prosecutor's proof that the 
3"The substance of footnote 19 appears in the second full paragraph of page 13. 
The substance of footnote 20 appears in the third full paragraph on page 14. 
The substance of footnote 21 appears in the second full paragraph on page 18. 
The substance of footnote 22 appears in the first full paragraph on page 19. 
16 
odometer statement for the S-10 was fraudulent. State's brief at 41. The record 
counters this theory. roved that the organization that 
employed Marshall and several other defense witnesses engaged in fraud as a 
matter of course, but also submitted additional proof that the S-10 odometer 
statement was fraudulent, without submitting any proof that Marshall had nothing 
to do with 268 at 252-53, 1263-64). 
Contrary to the State's argument that counsel for Marshall is 
misrepresenting the record, the record demonstrates that trial counsel did submit 
into evidence thf odometer statei 
testimony that the statement was accurate (R. 268 at 263-64), and this did prove 
odometer fraud, because when the dealership received the truck, the mileage 
w;i'i,il V? fVin iinl lln i nil mii'li i I IIMIII nl imln .ili'il mill ,U|(MII X'DM) ind 
thus clearly did not reflect the roughly three hundred and fifty miles that 
Sprouse's wife drove the truck before Abplanalp bought it (R. 268 at 194-96, 
199). This 
was not a reasonable strategy to admit this evidence. The State's suggestion 
that this was sound trial strategy is unfounded. See State's brief at 43. 
The State < 
on Abplanalp to produce clear title to the car within forty-eight hours, this may 
have backfired on Marshall, because the jurors may have found him at fault for 
;.. i brief at 
43-44. The jurors did find Marshall at fault for not insuring the clear title to the 
17 
car when it convicted him of equity skimming. Submitting proof that supported 
the defense and dealership's position that Abplanalp had a legal duty to clear the 
title was fully consistent with and helpful to the defense. 
The State repeats its argument assailing the briefing on the issue of 
prejudice. State's brief at 45-46. As noted above, Marshall's prejudice 
argument, which applies to all claims of error in the case, first appears at pages 
29 through 31 of the opening brief.4 It is summarized, repeated and/or referred 
back to in the brief. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 38-40 and 49-50.5 Given 
the thorough statement facts provided at pages 6 through 20 of the opening brief, 
which details the strengths and weaknesses of the State's case, the prejudice 
arguments accurately and adequately explain why, in the evidentiary context of 
this case, the errors require reversal. 
D. Payoff Authorization Form. 
In its statement of facts, the State contends, "Abplanalp was familiar with 
the pay off authorization form and was able to describe the size (8.5" x 3") and 
color of the document before seeing it in court (R. 132:19; pi's exh. 6)." State's 
brief at page 6. 
4|n referring back to this prejudice argument in the opening brief, counsel 
erroneously cited to pages 30 and 31, and omitted reference to page 29. 
5 l t is standard appellate practice to refer back to arguments which apply multiple 
times in briefs, in lieu of repeating them over and over. See State's brief at 41 
(referring the Court to a previous argument the State wishes to raise again 
without repeating in full). 
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By turning to the addendum of this brief, this Court can confirm that page 
19 of R. 132 is the preliminary hearing transcript, wherein Abplanalp testified 
that he did not sign ;in .'iiithorizntiiin lui II.IVMII limn 11M-» St;-Hi• 
mischaracterized his testimony about color and dimension. His only testimony 
describing a paper was this: "I signed a little paper releasing the title to Mountain 
States Motor." 
In its argument, the State does not acknowledge that Abplanalp testified at 
the preliminary hearing that he did not sign an authorization for payoff form (R. 
1 ' testified to having signed it (R. 
267: 62, 76). He went so far as to describe the unusual size and the color nl II w < 
form on the first day of trial (id.)." State's brief at 33. 
can confirm that on 
pages 62 and 76 of Abplanalp's trial testimony, he did not describe the 
unusual color of the form. On page 62, he claimed to have signed a title 
rr 'ledsc , IJI id explained believed that the dealership would pay off the 
Monte Carlo because it was "just pretty much common sense when yni i 11, i<!< • in 
a vehicle you're trading it in to get it paid off and get a newer vehicle." (R. 267 at 
jefense counsel identified the authorization for payoff form 
as white, and gave Abplanalp a blank one, leading him to testify that 
signed such a form (R. 267 at 76). The State's description of Abplanalp's 
pay-off authorization form is simply not accurate. 
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Trial counsel's presentation of a blank form to Abplanalp at trial to support 
his trial testimony that he signed such a form combined with trial counsel's failure 
to present sufficient foundation to admit his file to show that it contained no such 
form was objectively deficient. This deficiency was particularly harmful and 
indefensible in light of his failure to cross-examine Abplanalp with his preliminary 
hearing testimony that he did not sign an authorization pay-off form (R. 132 at 
19). 
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT REQUIRES REVERSAL. 
The State argues that the prosecutor was accurate in arguing that Shelly 
Sorenson testified that credit union employees do not worry about the payoff 
amount line on car sales contracts. State's brief at 21, citing to R. 267:106. 
If the Court will turn to the addendum to this brief, the Court can confirm 
that on pages 105 and 106, Sorenson testified that the credit union employees 
do not worry about that part of the transaction in cases in which the sales 
contract does not mention a payoff amount; but she did not testify that they 
routinely disregard the portion of contracts specifying who would pay off their 
liens (R. 267 at 105-106). Shelly Sorenson testified that most of the time, it is 
specified in the contracts when dealerships are going to make payoffs (R. 267 at 
105), tacitly acknowledging that she does pay attention to that line in the 
contract. 
20 
The State claims that Marshall misrepresents the focus of the prosecutor's 
argument 1 .Ule'\ h i " l . i l . ' . ' Mi'.1 im oul confirms that the prosecutor used 
Shelly Sorenson's supposed but non-existent testimony that credit • 
the payoff line in contracts to bolster Abplanalp's testimony that Mountain States 
v\ apposed car, even though the plain language of the contract 
he signed indicated that there was zero balan 
at 287. 
The State argues that the prosecutor properly argued that Marshall told 
Abplanalp that "it would be better" if he i.' iI. ilet,,, n i< I 
that the jurors could almost infer that this was proof of Marshall's attempt to hide 
the transaction (R. 268 at * State's brief at 23. In so arguing, the State 
presents the testimn P 
the truck through Mountain states, and then apparently infers from the testimony 
< nese two men that Marshall made the offer to finance twice. State's brief at 
?3. 
There is nothing to indicate that Marshall made two offers to finance the 
truck, and nothing to support the prosecutor's argument that it was almost proper 
to infer that Marshall vvm, HinHiy liyin<i In linlc lir. minimis ilmil I n Hie 
contrary, because the Monte Carlo was not of value to the dealership until the 
title was clear, Marshall had no incentive to make or hide a deal in which no one 
21 
The State condones as a reasonable interpretation of the evidence the 
prosecutor's argument that Marshall was lying about Abplanalp's responsibility to 
pay off the Monte Carlo, because Marshall claimed to be relying on Abplanalp's 
oral commitment to do so, in contradistinction to Marshall's reliance on the 
written contract for Abplanalp to borrow and pay back the final $918.35. State's 
brief at 25. 
The prosecutor's juxtaposition of the contract for $918.35, with his 
repeated argument that in contrast, Marshall was claiming that he was relying on 
nothing but Abplanalp's word regarding the payoff, was not a reasonable 
interpretation of the evidence. It was disingenuous and misleading, given that 
the contract Abplanalp signed reflected that no balance was owed on the Monte 
Carlo, and given Marshall's repeated testimony that he was relying on that 
contract for Abplanalp to pay off the Monte Carlo (R. 268 at 233, 235, 240-43). 
The State claims that Marshall's prejudice argument is cumulative and 
inadequate. State's brief at 27. 
Marshall's prejudice argument, which applies to all claims of error in the 
case, first appears at pages 29 through 31 of the opening brief. 6 It is 
summarized, repeated and/or referred back to in the brief. See Opening Brief of 
6|n referring back to this prejudice argument in the opening brief, counsel 
erroneously cited to pages 30 and 31, and omitted reference to page 29. 
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Appellant at 38-40 and 49-507 Given the thorr , | l , ,1 ,K;,nciil l,K',t.\ [i,.tvul<ul .il 
pages 6 through 20 of the opening brief, which details the strengths and 
weaknesses ul II it? State's case, the prejudice arguments accurately and 
adequately explain /identian 
reversal. 
The State does not contest that it has the burden of proving the 
prosecutorial misi. i ii I i II I,1! Ivyni.1,,1 , r.on.il l*j JULJLI I make any 
effort to shoulder this burden. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 37. Because 
the prosecutorial misconduct probably influenced the verdict, and deprived 
Marsh; ill ul i I HI hi il in In il i in i l n \<c oLtt . , roy, 688 P.2d 483, 
486 (Utah 1984). 
7 l t is standard appellate practice to refer back to arguments which apply multiple 
times in briefs, in lieu of repeating them over and over. See State's brief at 41 
(referring the Court to a previous argument the State wishes to raise again 
without repeating in full). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Mr. Marshall's convictions and remand this 
matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing law. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ IVday of December, 2004. 
BUGDEN & ISAACSON, L L C . 
By: lAo i i ^T . R 
WALTER F. BUGDE 
TARA L. ISAACSON 
ELIZABETH HUNT 
Attorneys for Appellant 
NT^R.( \ 
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following-
Kris C. Leonard 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City I IT R4114 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
Proof of the commission of the crime of Equity Skimming, requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the following elements 
of that crime: 
1. That Dustin Marshall; 
2. On or about July 19, 2 002 
3. Did as a dealer or broker; 
4. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly; 
a. Transferred or arranged the transfer of a vehicle for 
consideration or profit; 
5. When he knew or should have known the vehicle was subject 
to a security interest; 
6. Without first obtaining written authorization of the holder 
of the security interest. 
A-26 IV/l 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER JI ? 
When you retire to deliberate, you will select one of your 
members as foreman who will preside over your deliberations. Your 
verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreman, and when found 
must be returned to you into this Court. 
Your verdict must be either: 
1. Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED 
relating to Count I, incident date of July 9, 2002, as charged in 
the Information. 
2 . Not guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN 
REQUIRED relating to Count I, incident date of July 9, 2002, as 
charged in the Information. 
3. Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED 
relating to Count II, incident date of July 18, 2002, as charged in 
the Information. 
4. Not guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN 
REQUIRED relating to Count II, incident date of July 18, 2002, as 
charged in the Information. 
5. Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED 
relating to Count III, incident date of July 19, 2002, as charged 
in the Information. 
A-27 
6. Not guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN 
REQUIRED relating to Count III, incident date of July 19, 2002, as 
charged in the Information. 
7. Guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN REQUIRED 
relating to Count IV, incident date of August 3, 2002, as charged 
in the Information. 
8. Not guilty of ACTING IN CAPACITY WITHOUT LICENSE WHEN 
REQUIRED relating to Count IV, incident date of August 3, 2002, as 
charged in the Information. 
9. Guilty of EQUITY SKIMMING as charged in a separate criminal 
Information, date* July 19, 2002. 
10. Not guilty of EQUITY SKIMMING as charged in a separate 
criminal Information, dated July 19, 2002. 
A-28 |5\ 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DUSTIN MARSHALL, 
Defendant . 
V E R D I C T 
CASE NO. 021800313 
031800019 
We, the Jury impaneled in the above-entitled cause, find the 
Defendant, DUSTIN MARSHALL, guilty of EQUITY SKIMMING as charged in 
a separate criminal Information dated July 19, 2002. 
DATED this tf day of A <+£>> , 2003. 
FOREMAN 
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car; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall specifically if you told anyone how much 
that lien was? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Who did you tell specifically how much that lien was? 
A. It was Dusty Marshall. 
THE COURT: Now, we're talking about the time — 
Q. BY MS. BARTON-COOMBS: At the time of the forming of 
the contract, when you were negotiating to buy this pick-up? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that time did you discuss specifically who was 
going to pay that lien off? 
A. We did not. 
Q. Did you sign any documents with Mountain States Motor 
or Mr. Marshall considering — concerning the lien at Mountain 
America giving them authorization for a payoff or allowing them 
contact with the bank to make that payoff? 
A. I signed a little paper releasing the title to 
Mountain States Motor. 
Q. Okay, that didn't answer my question. Did you sign a 
paper authorizing Mountain States Motor to talk with Mountain 
America about the amount of your lien, the payoff amount or 
authorizing them to pay that off? 
A. No, I did not. 
C-30 
-62-
Q. Okay. Now, moving onto this information concerning 
the trade in or the amount owed to Mountain America, you said 
that it never really came up until you brought the $10,000 
check. 
Can you explain to the jury what happened then, or what your 
conversation — who did you bring the check to and what was 
your conversation? 
A. After I left Mountain America I brang the check and 
handed it to Dusty Marshall. They already had the S-10 ready 
to go. They had the temporary permits on it and everything, 
and I gave the check to him, and I said the title's ready for 
them whenever they go get it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. You know, I had told Mountain America that Mountain 
States would be coming to get the title. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I just told them that when they go get the title 
they can, and I then signed a title release. 
Q. Okay, and did you tell them that you had paid the 
Monte Carlo off? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Okay. Why is it — can you help the jury understand 
why is it you believe that the Monte Carlo would be paid off? 
A. Because it's just pretty much common sense when you 
trade in a vehicle you're trading it in to get it paid off and 
D-31 
-76-
Honor? 
THE COURT: Would you like that marked as an exhibit? 
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Not at this time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q. BY MS. BARTON-COOMB S: Mr. Abplanalp, have you ever 
seen anything like this white form that I've just handed you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you see one of those? 
A. When I took the $10,000 to Dusty Marshall. 
Q. Is this what you're saying you filled out? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that document called? 
A. It says, "Authorization for payoff." 
Q. Okay. So when you talk about a title release, is this 
the document you're referring to? 
A. Yes. I didn't know the exact name for it'V 
Q. Okay. Did you sign any other documents? 
A. Not pertaining to the title I didn't. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I just signed the loan agreement at Mountain America 
and that's all I signed. 
Q. For the $918? 
A. I signed that at Mountain States. 
Q. Okay, but you did sign another note for the $918? 
A. Yes, I did. 
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